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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
 
TRANSITIONAL (IN)JUSTICE 
NORMATIVE REQUIREMENTS, POLITICAL COMMITMENTS 
 
In the difficult balance between justice and truth and in order to the ends of 
trans-national justice, the aim of the paper is to formulate a model of transi-
tional justice that gives account of possible tensions and equilibriums between 
truth and justice, between retribution and restoration, memory and oblivion, 
past and present. It needs to be clarified what happens to truth when it is pub-
licly recognised, when it is included in the cognitive public scene, and how this 
recognition affects politics. The comparison between a retributive paradigm of 
justice, that prescribes to punish those who are responsible for the violation, 
and a restorative one, focused on therapeutic and reparative dynamics aimed at 
reconciliation, leaves open theoretical and normative questions involving the 
meaning of retributive justice and its possible, or desirable, negotiability. From 
a more practical perspective too, attempts at balancing normative requirements 
and political commitments are unavoidable and dilemmatic. 
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TRANSITIONAL (IN)JUSTICE.  
NORMATIVE REQUIREMENTS, POLITICAL COMMITMENTS 
 
 
BEATRICE MAGNI 
 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
To consider the relation between democracy and justice requires to move on 
different levels of enquiry and to assume different perspectives of research. 
The basic question the paper aims at answering is the following: is it possible 
to consider democracy as a fruitful notion in political theories and political 
practices? Such a question will be addressed both in normative terms and by 
referring to practices appealing to democracy and to justice out of political or 
juridical intents. 
One of the most important issues of political philosophy turn on the contro-
versial question of what justice requires. The Gallie’s concept/conception dis-
tinction is extremely useful as a tool for clarifying the nature of disagreements 
about what the justice is and what it should be (Gallie 1956)1: perhaps the most 
famous use of the concept/conception distinction is found in Rawls's theory 
of justice, where Rawls appeals to the distinction between the abstract, ideal 
concept of justice and particular conceptions of justice, namely the particular 
instantiations, realizations or different and potentially conflicting articulations 
of the concept. His theory, justice as fairness, is defended as the best conception 
of justice, where «a theory, however elegant and economical, must be rejected 
or revised if it is untrue; likewise, laws and institutions no matter how efficient 
and well-arranged must be reformed or abolished if they are unjust» (Rawls 
1971, p. 3). 
Here, and to try to proceed accordingly with the aims of my essay, it seems to 
be plausible to sustain that concern for justice and some concept of injustice 
are powerfully and inseparably linked. 
Injustice, on the one hand, is not an outstanding, a “residual” value: if one 
looks at our many injustices, as Shklar suggests (Shklar 1990), what becomes 
 
1 In his article, Gallie – in short - remember the distinction between a concept (the 
shared or sharable core of a notion) and its conceptions (different and potentially con-
flicting articulations of the concept).  
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clear is how ordinary and pervasive they are. They spring from a violation of 
some justice’s rule or, to use a more rawlsian wording, of a legitimate justice’s 
expectation (Rawls 1971, p. 311). When using the term “injustice”, on the oth-
er hand, we should distinguish between plural and conflictual conceptions and 
experiences of injustice – regarding in this case as a fact-sensitive concept -, 
and a little common sense is sufficient to perceive the injustice as that feeling 
that accompanies the violation of a legitimate expectation of recognition or re-
spect. So what did you feel as you witnessed the injustice? How did you go 
about considering whether to intervene to stop the injustice while it was hap-
pening? If you put yourself in the victim’s place, how would you want the wit-
nesses or bystander to have responded? In what follows, I shall focus and 
briefly reflects upon some issues about human nature and society that are to be 
acknowledged when one inquiries into questions of injustice2. However, de-
spite the irreducibly political dimension of injustice, some philosophical ques-
tions need to be clarified. Political philosophy cannot simply focus on justice 
and assume that injustice is merely its obverse image. Rather, acts of injustice 
require independent and analytical study of their own. Thus I would suggest to 
examine injustice both in theoretical accounts of the tensions that arise be-
tween (mal)distribution and (mis)recognition, and to investigate these issues in 
a contemporary political argument, namely in the ideals and practices of con-
temporary democracies. 
On the one hand, injustice is often described as misfortune, and the line be-
tween injustice and misfortune is, in fact, vague and political. Disasters such as 
infant mortality and famine that were once misfortunes are now injustices be-
cause the advance of technology means that where they occur political corrup-
tion must be to blame. But other disasters seem less easy to categorize: for ex-
ample, an earthquake that wreaks its greatest havoc on the disadvantaged be-
cause they are forced to live in more poorly constructed housing than the rich 
is surely part injustice; but it is also a misfortune that the earthquake happened 
at all. Shklar reminds us that misfortunes are still possible and warns us that 
our technological advances should not either lull us into a false sense of securi-
ty or lead us always to look for scapegoats when disasters occur. Still, to regard 
acts of injustice as simply misfortunes is far worse a mistake and our greater 
obligation, then, is continually to speak out against what we feel are the injustic-
es committed against us whether we are ultimately supported in that feeling by 
our society or not. 
On the other hand, injustice could be considered as a strong – and partial - 
moral feeling: at the level of empathical relationships, there could be dangers 
linked to the intensity and passionate, relatively unreflective character of injus-
tice; at times, injustice seem to exclude a commitment to reasoned justification 
 
2 The topic of injustice will be discussed in the framework of non-ideal theory, i.e. a 
theory which takes the current situation and the constraints of political feasibility into 
account.  
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of conduct and thus to encourage irresponsible action. The same ambiguities 
seem to surround injustice when it appears in public space. Our attachments – 
to individuals and to groups – all too often reveal themselves to be mutually 
incompatible. That is why an aggrieved sense of injustice has an important role to 
play in political life: as social and political conditions change, new injustices are 
bound to arise, and the political order can relieve them only if we are willing to 
lend a sympathetic ear to those who are aggrieved. Injustice, then, should be-
come one of the touchstones of political philosophy. 
 
 
 
2. A SENSE OF INJUSTICE 
 
A «sense of injustice» could be taken to be a propensity to feel resentment and 
indignation at injustices. In order to get a clearer picture of the sense of injus-
tice, therefore, it is arguable to look at what is involved in the sense of justice, 
and to take as a starting-point Rawls’s account. Rawls distinguish between re-
sentment as a response to wrongs done to oneself, and indignation as a re-
sponse to wrongs done to others (Rawls 1971, p. 474). His account takes the 
form of a moral construction in which he distinguishes between three stages in 
the development of an individual’s sense of justice. These are: 
 
- the morality of authority: the child comes to love and trust her parents 
in response to their love for her. That love and trust involves a dispo-
sition to act in accordance with the injunctions of her parents, and to 
feel guilt at her failures to do so (Rawls 1971, p. 462-467); 
- the morality of association: as the growing individual comes to partici-
pate in various forms of association and cooperation, beginning with 
the family and extending outwards, and as she finds that she can de-
pend on her fellow-participants, she develops feelings of friendship 
and trust towards them. As these ties are established, she tends to ex-
perience feelings of (association) guilt when she fails to do her part, 
and feelings of resentment and indignation when others fail to do so 
(Rawls 1971, p. 467-472).; 
- the morality of principles: at this higher stage, the recognition that we 
and those we care for are the beneficiaries of an established set of just 
institutions engenders an attachment to the principles of justice them-
selves. The individual who has developed this attachment will tend to 
honour her duties and obligations to others even when she is not 
bound to them by ties of particular fellow-feeling, and will feel guilt 
when she fails to do so (Rawls 1971, p. 472-479). 
 
In exploring the plurality of circumstances of resentment and indignation it 
seems therefore to be that individuals should acquire the competences to iden-
tify jointly one standard for moral feelings and some critical explanation of 
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that. Otherwise, the sense of justice calls on some interpretation of a sense of 
injustice. In rawlsian view therefore the desire to reduce or eliminate inequali-
ties is properly motivated by a sense of injustice: resentment of inequalities is akin 
to the resentment of other states of affairs which are recognised quite properly 
to arouse a sense of injustice, and this sense of injustice can in turn be located 
within a wider family of recognisable and acceptable moral attitudes. To under-
stand why the resentment is a resentment of injustice, what is vital is the con-
text of a scheme of cooperation, involving relations of mutual trust and reli-
ance. This violation of trust is the breaking of an agreement, a promise or a 
contract, and that is the proper object of resentment. Those who themselves 
make claims of justice are participants in this understanding, and that is why 
they are properly resented by others if they fail to meet the requirements of 
justice3. 
 
 
 
3. INJUSTICE AND DISRESPECT 
 
If a sense of injustice is connected with some experiences of denial or absence 
of inclusion or equal treatment, it seems possible to sustain that concerns for 
justice and respect for personhood are powerfully and inseparably linked. 
It is always Rawls to provide a rich account of self-respect and respect as a fea-
ture of reciprocity. He suggests that self-respect has two aspects: first, it in-
volves a sense that I consider myself and my life plans as worthy and having 
value; second, that I have confidence in my ability to achieve my plans. Social 
conditions that make it more likely for me to able to enjoy and maintain my 
self-respect, according to Rawls, involve having ‘at least one community of 
shared interests’ to which I can belong that will validate my sense of my own 
value and my plans’ value, as well as make it more likely that I can achieve 
these plans, presumably through moral and other kinds of support (Rawls 
1971, p. 407). Rawls famously argues that self-respect is the most important 
primary good. Given this premise, it is important that he explain what bearing 
hit two principles of justice have on individuals’ self-respect. Rawls suggests 
 
3 Moreover, the resentment of injustice has a place within a larger family of recognisa-
ble and acceptable moral responses and attitudes. It is a response to being treated just 
as a means. We can distinguish a resentment at inequalities from resentment at the 
breaking of a promise or an agreement, and from resentment at being the victim of 
force or fraud, but we can also recognise affinities between these cases, and by doing 
so we can begin to make sense of the idea of being used as a thing in contrast to being 
respected as a person. Since kantian perspective, the more one treats another just as a 
means to be used, the more one’s treatment of the other is wrong and is properly re-
sented. There is of course no mathematical formula for measuring the degrees to 
which people are used as means, but common sense indicates that we can make rough 
comparison and contrasts. 
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that the two principles of justice are institutional ways for citizens to express 
their mutual respect. The difference principle is meant to both symbolize and 
uphold citizens’ mutual respect and self-respect. ‘By arranging inequalities for 
reciprocal advantage and by abstaining from the exploitation of the contingen-
cies of nature and social circumstance within a framework of equal liberties, 
person express their respect for one another in the very constitution of their 
society’, he writes (Rawls 1971, p. 429). Rawls also asserts that the first princi-
ple of justice – the guarantee of equal basic rights and liberties – is a basis for 
self-respect: ‘the effect of self-government where equal political rights have 
their fair value is to enhance the self-esteem and the sense of political compe-
tence of the average citizen’ (Rawls 1971, p. 440). Rawls’s work should be ap-
plauded for attempting to provide a theory of self-respect formation, and for 
his recognition that our self-respect crucially depends on others’ view of us. 
We can legitimately demand freedom from harm and from injustice, and by the 
same logic we are not free to inflict harm or to treat others unjustly: respect for 
other people would preclude everyone from trying to treat anyone else like 
Pavlov’s dog. 
The greatest single instance of injustice is so found in the dis-respect. Disrespect 
produces feelings of injustice because it creates a sort of social and political 
imbalance: an act of disrespect is unjust because it deprives people of some-
thing to which they are entitled and because it subjects people to something 
they do not deserve (Miller 1993). Despite their diversity, all instances of disre-
spect (discrimination, arbitrary treatments, racism, unwarranted punishments, 
intolerance among religious groups and so on) may have something in com-
mon, like a failure to adequately recognize autonomous, independent, sensitive, 
morally significant individuals. 
On this point, namely to define what does and does not count as disrespectful, 
Nancy Fraser’s (Fraser 2001) analysis of the obstacles to political and social jus-
tice represents an advance at a theoretical level. Fraser argues that social justice 
movements in modern societies protest two distinct kinds of injustice: maldis-
tribution and misrecognition. Some groups, she writes, mainly suffer the first 
kind, distributive injustice. Different specific remedies might be appropriate 
here, ranging from redistribution to increasing the consumption share of the 
poor to the reorganization of the division of labour. In general, the goal of the 
distributive paradigm of justice is a more fair distribution of resources and 
goods. For the second type of injustice, injustice as misrecognition, the remedy 
must be recognition, not redistribution. In general, the goal of the recognition 
paradigm of justice is a ‘difference-friendly’ world, where assimilation to major-
ity or dominant cultural norms is no longer the price of equal respect’ (Fraser 
1996). In summary, Fraser has reframed the notion of respect through her du-
alist framework of justice, in which the injustices of maldistribution and mis-
recognition are independent, irreducible and equally primary forms of injustice. 
Fraser’s issues have been more fully explored in her dialogue with Axel Hon-
neth (Fraser-Honneth 2003), where Fraser continues to defend a perspectival 
dualism, capable of integrating the insights derived from a theory of distribu-
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tion and a theory of recognition, each necessary but incapable of reduction to 
the other, while Honneth defend a normative theory of mutual recognition, ac-
cording to which the integrity of human subjects, vulnerable as they are to inju-
ry through insult and disrespect, depends on their receiving approval and re-
spect from others: “the essence of everything which, in moral theory, is known 
as ‘human dignity’ can only be ascertained indirectly by determining the forms 
of personal degradation and injury, and it was only such negative experiences 
of disrespect and insult that turned the normative goal of securing human dig-
nity into a driving force in history” (Honneth 1992, p. 187). Put schematically, 
there are in Honneth’s framework three primary dimensions of intersubjective 
relations of recognition: love, rights, and solidarity. Recognition claims related 
to love or care are localized primarily in the spheres of intimacy, the family, 
and friendship. Recognition claims related to the sphere of rights are expressed 
primarily in terms of universal moral and legal principles and citizenship rights 
in the modern democratic state. Claims to esteem are based upon a shared 
community of value and social solidarity that accords social honour and dignity 
to the contributions of each to the welfare of all. Along each of these axes of 
recognition, there are corresponding forms of disrespect, such as physical and 
emotional abuse, exclusion and denial of basic rights, and dismissal or denigra-
tion of socially useful traits and abilities. For Honneth, these categorical dis-
tinctions provide the basic framework for the elucidation and evaluation of 
empirically observable struggles for recognition and social justice, past and pre-
sent. These three patterns of recognition – love, rights, and solidarity – there-
fore set down the formal requirements for conditions of interaction within 
which human beings can feel assured of their ‘dignity’ or ‘integrity’. 
A hallmark of Fraser’s and Honneth’s version of disrespect is to insist that the 
dimension of injustice is irreducibly political. 
On this wake, Margalit’s decent society (Margalit 1996) offers a sustained, in-
novative and well-informed discussion of this issue. A decent society, in Mar-
galit's view, is a society whose institutions do not humiliate its members. He 
presents the logical, moral and cognitive reasons for choosing a sort of nega-
tive politics: it is not justice that brings us to politics but injustice – the avoid-
ance of evil rather than the pursuit of the good. In contrast to the elusiveness 
of the abstract notion of human dignity, the phenomenon of humiliation is 
tangible and instantly recognizable; so too is the notion of evil associated with 
it. Heading off evils and not the attempt to realize an ideal condition of justice 
should be the central focus of political thought and action. If we start from 
dealing with evils rather than striving for an ideal good—as Margalit propose – 
it is clear that in a decent society many types of injustice would be corrected; it 
is no less clear that remedying injustice is not the same as moving toward a 
condition of perfect justice. But his point is not that theories of ideal justice 
(such as those of John Rawls, for example) should be replaced by a philosophy 
that focuses simply on making the world less unjust—a position set out in Sen 
(2009). Margalit’s argument (Margalit 2010) is different and more radical: the 
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struggle for a decent society requires compromise, including the willingness to 
accept a less just world where this is necessary in order to stave off greater and 
disrespectful evil. To characterize an institution as not unjust does not amount 
to characterizing it as just: an institution might be in an ‘interim zone’ as it 
were, where it will be considered not-unjust and yet it will not quite qualify as 
just either. There is in Margalit’s view a sort of “minimum floor” injustice’s 
principle that simply attempts to guarantee a decent set of opportunities that 
would allow individuals to function decently wherever they are. But, whilst it 
may be true that the minimum floor principle takes us some way in the direc-
tion of avoiding the most pervasive inequalities, it is important to be clear that 
it does not remove all of them. In any case, the decent set of opportunities is 
surely the primary goal rather than the equal set. It is a goal via negativa: recogni-
tion claims are first revealed primarily as experiences of misrecognition, respect 
claims are first revealed primarily as experiences of disrespect. But if disrespect 
itself connotes a moral negative, then even if all instances of disrespect have 
nothing else in common besides that negative valence, they will all be at least 
morally condemnable, and in that case disrespect can enable the normative 
work we want done by a supposed theory of injustice. 
 
 
4. TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE AND ITS IMPROVEMENTS 
 
But now it is right to take small steps, and begin to consider that transitional 
justice appears a concept squeezed between two contrary forces. The first is 
the necessity to ensure a smooth transition from the “old” autocratic regime to 
new democratic actors – it thus follows a renunciation to start penal action 
against those guilty of crimes in the “old” order. Secondly, there is the opposite 
necessity, on the one hand, to fulfil the expectation of victims seeking retribu-
tion, while on the other, to pursue the de-legitimization of the “old” oppressor 
through recourse to law4.  
Taking this into account, legalistic conceptions of the retributive justice para-
digm – contemplating mandatory prosecution and punishment of those found 
guilty of whatsoever violation – are put into question by a competing paradigm 
– a new model - (restorative justice), which is centred on therapeutic as well as 
restorative dynamics, and consequently having the power to encourage recon-
ciliation. This new model of justice – restorative justice, of which thin as well 
as thick versions are available (depending on circumstantial factors such as 
time and place), has four main aspects: 
 
a) it condemns but refrains from sanctioning; 
 
4 Post-apartheid South-Africa is a case in point – there, the relationship between jus-
tice and the building of a new constitutional and democratic order has been articulated 
in  a most innovative (and controversial) manner. 
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b) generates provisional claims aimed at establishing the truth (but I will come 
back to this later); 
 
c) is nurtured by the precariousness typical of slipping democracies; 
 
d) focuses on victims. 
 
Comparing retributive and restorative paradigms raises crucial theoretical and 
normative questions, that pertain to the meaning of retributive justice itself, 
and its possible, or desirable, negotiability; further, it leads us to consider the 
case that the method favoured by restorative justice, i.e. TRC could give shape 
to a really alternative model of justice. 
Thus, we can reasonably agree that, to the question on whether considering 
TRC not just as palliative for locales where the application of law is lacking (a 
faute de mieux solution), but as an alternative way of dispensing justice in its own 
right, we can give a nearly positive answer. Comparisons between retributive 
and restorative paradigms articulate the alternative between judgment and – for 
instance – forgiving, as effective strategies competing  with revenge as legiti-
mate (and possible) methods to manage transitions to democracy. These two 
paradigms reflect diverging visions of the relationship between justice and pub-
lic good. 
A close look at restorative justice “toolbox” reveals at first sight elements that 
witness its viability as alternative model for justice: 
 
1) crime understood as violation of a (human) being by another (and not as 
violation of rules); 
 
2) push toward having offenders acknowledge their guilt, in order to make up and 
to avoid further violations; 
 
3) ways to solve and prevent should be agreed on by the parties involved through 
deliberation within an informal and consensual process (i.e. victim-offender 
mediation, reconciliation program, conferencing, family group conference, cir-
cle sentencing); 
 
4) victim and offender should find a common ground, and the latter must be 
reintegrated into the system. 
 
However, a first question here arises: is the restorative paradigm a viable op-
tion, even preferable to others, for transition to democracy? In other words, is 
it possible to ensure a transition - without losses in retributive terms – from a 
divided past to a present of sharing? If transitional justice is justice for crisis 
times, I wonder if it could be fruitful to add some new layers to the above-
mentioned toolbox. As the lack of an explicit delimitation between winners 
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and losers, and the consequent need to consider the “old” leadership not only 
as threat and problem, but also as legitimate  actor and possibly reference point 
for the transition to the “new” order, I wonder  if Smith’s idea of sympathy 
might be included in the toolbox, and if so, to what effect; for Smith we enter 
into another person’s situation rather than into their feelings: impartial specta-
tor is expected to become as well informed as possible about the circumstances 
at hand, and to remain as fair as possible in spite of his natural biases. As 
Griswold puts it, impartial spectatorship ‘does not require a Rawlsian veil of 
Ignorance. The impartial spectator does not forget his own conception of the 
good life but understands when a virtue (especially justice) calls for restraining 
his demand that others act in accordance with his conception’. This result in a 
suspension of moral judgment of actions until after an imaginary exchange 
with the actor has been attempted. Crucially, Sympathy depends on exposure 
to details, on familiarity with specifics. I need to know as much as possible 
about those circumstances. But the imagination needs something to work with. 
It needs data. On the other hand, if I begin to sympathize with another, and 
make an effort to place myself in her circumstances, this can serve as an inde-
pendent motivation and encouragement for endowing her with the same rights 
I have. 
In other words, an insistence on absolute justice might lead to absolute injus-
tice. Sympathy, with its focus on particulars, can be a very useful buffer against 
the temptations of absolute justice. To the uncompromising cry: ‘I am right!’ 
sympathy replies with a more feasible question: ‘how do I make life bearable? 
Again, exposure to context does not eradicate the possibility of moral criticism. 
Even if it raises extenuating considerations, there remains a difference between 
extenuation and exculpation. Context gives us pause; it makes us think twice 
about our reactions. This does not render us incapable of deciding or acting; it 
just makes it more likely that we will decide and act carefully. This might not 
be conducive of forgiveness, but it does, to use Michael Ignatieff’s term, “nar-
row the range of permissible lies”. If sympathy is conducive of political recon-
ciliation, the TRC’s work was, at the very least, conducive of sympathy. 
Secondly, reflecting on the statement that restorative justice represents, so to 
speak, a “lesser evil” useful to escape the dilemma truth-justice, I wonder if it 
might be possible to think of a more “homeopathic” therapy – I have in mind 
two  possible solutions. The first suggested by Rousseau – (a search for the 
remedy into evil) his remède dans le mal prefigures, under certain conditions (i.e. 
in case of dirty “hands” ), the possibility that remedies to evil actions are to be 
found in evil actions themselves (Tirer du mal même le remède qui doit le guérir: telle 
est l’intuition fondamentale de la philosophie politique de Rousseau); the second possible 
solution integrates the first, and takes into account a point of view on the con-
cept of stasis as suggested by Nicole Loraux in The Divided City (Loraux 1992) – 
that is, common grounds originate precisely from division and conflict, and 
reconciliation is possible only in the light of rupture. 
During the IV century BC in Athens, Loraux claims, the lack of superior au-
thority made the recourse to politics unavoidable. With no constitutional tool 
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to make a minority accept the deliberations of a majority, stasis became a legit-
imate outcome. Likewise, in slipping democracies the lack of a system of con-
stitutional coercion makes stasis an inescapable conditio sine qua non – while, at 
the same time, transitional justice becomes a semi-constitutional tool for im-
plementing reforms and promoting change. “Stasis” means “movement”, 
“commotion”. But it also means “position”, “immobility”: stasis, then, is a 
blocked (frozen) movement, a sort of barrier that doesn’t’ yield under stress 
and imposes on the city a paradoxical unity typical of synchronized uprisings 
of the two halves comprising a whole. Stasis, therefore, is a paradoxical politi-
cal paradigm: it is what makes conflict possible – conflict made perpetual, sta-
ble. Lack of commotion, Loraux claims, brings division. Further, without con-
flict, there will be division. Thus, a certain degree of conflict could ensure uni-
ty. 
What I would like to suggest in this essay, then, is rethinking transitional justice 
through the lens of stasis. In other words, if reconciliation (of values, opinions, 
and worldviews) is produced by way of rupture, made explicit in our case, what 
bonds individuals with different backgrounds together could be a sort of (pre-
disposition) competence, expertise, towards conflict, the awareness that bonds 
originate in the discontinuity of a division that is shared. 
What transitional justice allows us to see, then, is the right (measure of) dissent – 
something that unites and divides at the same time, the ability to tame con-
flicts. 
 
 
5. AD HOC JUSTICE? 
 
In summary, restorative justice is an ad hoc justice: in my opinion, this is not to 
be considered a weakness. On the contrary, it is a point of strength that – as 
Haldemann and Lefranc clearly states (Haldemann 2008, Lefranc 2011) – if 
channelled within an academic or professional context, will deceive its original 
spirit of a bottom up justice returned to the community, with all the features 
mentioned above, - its power grounded in its being exceptional, an exception 
shared and accepted by both parties, helping to address imbalances, re-
establish relationships, reconcile. “Not only good men make good societies, al-
so bad men make good societies”: this is its added value. Due to the peculiar 
truth-building practice that it offers, restorative justice contradicts the need to 
find a justice paradigm which will be valid in every time and everywhere. Be-
tween forgiveness and revenge, restorative justice offers a plural truth in the 
form of a continuous search for a balanced narration. It is a balanced truth, 
constructed by juxtapositioning one truth to the other (side by side), resulting 
in a final outcome produced by the constant tension between universalism and 
individualism. It is not factual truth, it is a truth about facts – a truth that at-
tempts to preserve opinions, not destroying them – otherwise, it would also 
destroy the political legitimacy of the individual. 
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The whole set of different opinions would be destroyed, with none of them 
likely to their place. But what do we talk about when we talk about truth in 
politics?  In transitional justice, truth doesn’t have a constitutive role within 
politics (nor factual truth can have it, given the discrepancy between factual 
truth and truth about facts): instead, it draws its borders, and becomes the 
starting point in times of crisis, - starting point understood as element of stabil-
ity. Therefore, to avoid the despotic trappings of consensus, and perhaps to 
avoid the relativistic trappings of forgiveness, the last tool I am suggesting 
comes from Hannah Arendt, whose remedy for an action doesn’t come from 
superior authority, but by a potential hidden in the action itself and, in particu-
lar, from the ability to forgive and from the ability to make, and keep, promis-
es. 
Restorative justice is the most evident example of justice that is neither sub-
stance nor foundation that we can employ indiscriminately, that we have once 
and for all. Concerning the meaning of justice as it emerges from your re-
search, and the justice/truth trade-off, truth is besieged because we seem not 
to want to face it, recognize it, accept it, or believe it. But truth is threatened as 
well because we cannot believe it. Truth is far too outrageous to be believable. 
How therefore can we put such atrocities and criminality behind us? The rem-
edy suggested is to forget the past, blank out the past and cover it up with im-
ages that shield us from its terrors. Even when “successful”, then, this strategy 
of systematic forgetfulness, amnesia or oblivion carries calamitous costs. 
But how might it be normatively acceptable to look for a balance between ret-
ribution and restoration? What do we mean when we talk about re-establishing 
a violated order? If, in a restorative context, reconciliation is a priority and to 
make peace remains the main objective, and if, in a retributive context, the pri-
ority is to do justice, in spite of possible political impacts and whatever condi-
tioning factor, the priority for transitional justice is to seek stability or find 
truths to turn into foundation for pursuing social and moral aims? Is the search 
for stability a good enough reason to sacrifice justice? Is there well-grounded 
reason to sacrifice justice? 
 
 
6. TOWARDS A THEORY OF INJUSTICE 
 
If it seems plausible Shklar’s reflections (Shklar 1989) about what she calls “the 
subjective sense of injustice and the sentiments that make us cry out for re-
venge”, and if – as it is said - injustice anywhere is a threat to justice every-
where, according to the argument hitherto developed, a theory of injustice, 
compared to a theory of justice, ought to be defined, and on different ground 
as opposed to theories of justice. 
The general categories of a theory of injustice must be primarily articulated 
with historically contingent and variable experiences of disrespect. A theory of 
injustice calls first for the ascription of a right to rectification once an injustice 
has been perpetrated. An important component of Nozick’s theory of justice is 
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indeed the principle of rectification (Nozick 1974). To sum up, the principle of 
rectification maintains that victims of injustice are sufficiently compensated if 
they are no worse off (having received compensation) than they would have 
been had the injustice not taken place. According to Nozick, there are three 
sets of rules of justice, defining: 
 
- how things not previously possessed by anyone may be acquired; 
- how possession may be transferred from one person to another;  
- what must be done to rectify injustices arising from violations of the first 
 two rules. 
 
A distribution that doesn’t arise in accordance with these three sets of rules is a 
distribution unjust (Nozick 1974, p. 151): any distribution, irrespective of any 
pattern it may or may not have, is just provided it has the appropriate history, 
provided it did in fact come about in accordance with the rules of acquisition, 
transfer and rectification. Nozick sustain that it is an important task in each so-
ciety to work out what operable policy best approximates the results of a de-
tailed application of rules of rectification. It is possible that some tax-financed 
welfare program, or even Rawls’s rule of favouring the worst off group, may be 
justified as a means of rectification, if it can be assumed that the better off are 
beneficiaries of past injustices, and the worse off victims. He warns that his en-
titlement theory cannot be used to condemn any particular welfare scheme un-
less it is clear that it cannot be justified as a means of rectifying past injustices. 
But finally for Nozick the historical dimension is essential to any justification, 
for it is only by reference to origins, and not final structures, that justice can be 
defined (Brown 1986). 
Whatever difficulties it would be in applying the principle of rectification, a 
theory of injustice could be taken into account moral feelings and historical 
contingencies, and to balance them – in the negativistic way sustained by Hon-
neth and Margalit - with some principles of injustice, like disrespect and mis-
recognition. If moral feelings - as a sense of injustice - are facts, in a theory of 
injustice speaking, the work of political philosophy will be properly to be en-
gaged in the best geometry of such moral feelings. The presence of mutual re-
spect is the first requirement for this theory of injustice, respect in the deeper 
meaning who involves the recognition of the actual difference and otherness of 
potential opponents. This thick notion of respect does have a cognitive re-
quirement in that individuals have to be more familiar with, if not understand, 
always other’s viewpoints. 
A theory of injustice will so not have a specific origin. It will not result from a 
particular culture or tradition. Freedom from injustice is a desirable end that is 
shared globally. All people refuse fear of fear and injustice, and actively seek to 
reject the conditions of such a feeling, regardless of the times they live in, or 
their geographical locations. The question is with feasibility of the injustice’s 
claim. Describing how that theory may work in practice require a detailed (and 
highly controversial) analysis, which is beyond the scope of this article. The 
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point here was not to suggest a specific public policy about injustice, but only 
to give an idea of the theoretical and practical implications of embracing a 
normative theory of injustice, which is morally attractive and also followable, 
namely desirable and feasible: a theory of injustice equally interested in inde-
pendent variables – namely, the range of variables that affect the perception of 
injustice - and in identifying dependent measures, that is the ways in which 
feelings of injustice manifest themselves. A theory that could discover bases 
for reasoned agreement – or respectful disagreements (Fish 1999) - in a society 
where sharp divisions threaten to lead to conflict. This theory of injustice need 
standards to be employed  - in ordinary and extraordinary times - both as a 
regulative criteria for evaluating actual social and political practices and as a ba-
sis for constructing ideal models. 
Finding ways to motivate people to act less unjustly is arguably the most press-
ing challenge facing egalitarian justice today, to make new spaces for citizen-
ship. 
 
 
7. “HOW FAR BACK? DEMOCRACY, RESPONSIBILITY, AND INJUSTICE 
 
Of the factors that affect how disrespectful a harmful act is perceived to be, 
one of the most important is responsibility. To understand better how disre-
spectful treatment produces feelings of injustice, it is useful to examine the 
phenomenology of injustice. Because context matter. The details of the par-
ticular histories matter. What is at stake, in the case of injustice, is the attribu-
tion of responsibility, and attribution of guilt is only one of the possible out-
comes. But if we value living in a society in which freedom is taken seriously, 
then we should takes responsibility seriously (Sheffler, 1992; Ripstein, 1994). 
And so we should take injustice – historical and not - seriously. In the second 
paragraph we’ve seen that moral agents who have a sense of justice and a 
commitment to the importance of respecting others as ends in themselves will 
necessarily feel indignation when others are treated unjustly and resentment 
when they themselves are treated unjustly. Here and now, but also – and more 
controversially – in the past. Understanding and dealing with the moral conse-
quences of the past is therefore one of the most important political issues of 
our time, and yet also one of the most intractable. 
Historical injustice is ever-present in human history. The origins of just about 
every institution relevant to human political life rise from several forms of in-
justice. Slavery, genocide, mass expropriation of property, mass internment, 
indiscriminate killings of civilians and massive political repression are all de-
pressingly familiar features of human history, both in the distant and more re-
cent past. Should any of them be redressed? Can historical injustice be re-
dressed? Dealing with historical injustice has also become a major task for 
countries struggling to found new institutions and forms of collective life after 
years of oppression or civil conflict – for example, in Central and Eastern Eu-
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rope after the fall of Soviet Communism, as well as in post-colonial Africa, 
South America and Asia. 
As a general issue, the challenge of dealing with historical injustice touches on 
a range of deeply contested yet essential concepts in contemporary political 
philosophy, such as the nature of rights and responsibility. And yet there are 
practical urgencies as well. Any plausible defence of the idea of making repara-
tions for past injustices must deal with some questions: how much normative 
weight should we give to the past? Which historical injustices matter and why? 
To whom are reparations owed? Who should pay them? What form of repara-
tion? What kind of prudential and political considerations need to be taken in-
to account when defending (or criticizing) reparations? 
By «historical» injustice we mean those harms or wrongs committed by indi-
viduals, groups or institutions against other individuals and groups who are 
now dead, but whose descendants live today. Historical injustice (Nozick 1974) 
is usually thought of in close relation to demands for reparations. And repara-
tions are usually thought of as involving payments to claimants on the basis of 
past wrongs, but where the transfer between identified wrongdoer and victim 
is complicated by the passage of time and where an ordinary legal remedy is 
unavailable. There are, at least, three different modes of reparation of an injus-
tice: 
 
- restitution: it correspond to a restoration, or handing back of 
the thing that was originally taken (if our land is stolen, we 
get it back); 
 
- compensation: it corresponds to make amends for, or offset 
the consequences of, a harm, accepting that literally restoring 
what was taken is impossible. We tend to talk about com-
pensation when the consequences of the wrong are such so 
as to render literal compensation impossible (no amount of 
money can compensate for being tortured, or for the legacy 
of colonialism); 
 
- recognition: it corresponds to a reparation that force the 
recognition of the basic humanity and subjectivity of the vic-
tims denied in the perpetration of harm against them. 
Recognition is, of course, built into the act of restoring to or 
compensating someone for a harm they have suffered. But 
recognition of responsibility takes on other meanings too, 
especially when embodied in a public apology and forms of 
collective remembrance. In fact, public recognition of past 
injustices is a uniquely political act. 
 
In general, reparations are intended to help re-construct or re-found a political 
community that has been broken by civil conflict, or scarred by historical injus-
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tice. That is, reparations are seen as contributing to an ideal of democratic in-
clusion, to what it means to treat each other equally, and thus to preserving and 
maintaining a democratic way of life. Restorative justice have its critics and op-
ponents who argue that restorative justice is not real justice at all: that for-
giveness sounds noble but that restoration in the form of amnesty or for-
giveness betrays victims of injustice. In particular, one could argue that retribu-
tion or revenge is the only possible just response to a genocide in which there 
is no legal recourse and no genuine restoration is possible. What is therefore 
the possibility for restorative justice in such situations? The Post-
Totalitarianism Trials offered a new basis for rethinking standards of responsi-
bility – Nazi criminality raised huge issues of responsibility that posed a radical 
challenge to traditional standards of politics, ethics and law. When it is justified 
to hold someone, or a group, responsible for their actions and when it is not? 
Responsibility is central to considerations of corrective injustice, of course, but 
it is also central to distributive justice. Corrective justice involves the rectifica-
tion of the wrongful invasions of legitimate entitlements that people hold, for 
example, to moveable of fixed property, or to bodily integrity and well-being. 
Thus it is often associated with what a person is due as punishment. Distribu-
tive justice, on the other hand, refers to what we’re legitimately entitled to in 
the first place, both negatively and positively, and thus the appropriate distribu-
tion of benefits and burdens within a political order. Therefore, corrective jus-
tice can’t be completely independent of considerations of distributive justice. 
In fact, our intuitions about distributive justice play a crucial role in providing a 
normative baseline against which we judge whether or not the violation of an 
entitlement merits a ‘correction’ of some kind. Thus, both corrective and dis-
tributive justice presupposes that people can be held responsible in various 
ways, in the sense that they can be held blameworthy. But in order to figure 
out which benefits she should have (or burdens she should bear) in the first 
place, we need a sense of what the overall distribution of them should be. Thus 
the purpose in assigning responsibility here is normative. In other words, we 
take responsibility claims seriously because of the importance of the underlying 
social and political relationships to which these claims refer and help protect. 
Now, can something like this idea of responsibility be attributed not only to 
individuals, but to groups? Can groups be held collectively responsible for their 
actions? The citizens of Saddam Hussein’s Iraq had little opportunity to shape 
or contest the decisions he took, and thus bear less collective responsibility – if 
any – for his genocidal treatment of the Kurds (and others). Having said that, it 
doesn’t follow that if a nation or state is deeply undemocratic or autocratic its 
members never bear any responsibility for its actions. So, it is important to 
note that responsibility can’t be made sense of exclusively in terms of consent: 
just by participating in interconnected and interdependent social, economic and 
political processes that produce such unjust conditions – that form the back-
ground to many individual actions - I have some responsibility for alleviating 
them. 
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If it’s hard enough to establish how both individuals and groups can be held 
responsible for their actions in the present, how can we hope to ascribe re-
sponsibility to them for things that happened in the past? Can we – as mem-
bers of political communities, for example - inherit responsibilities or obliga-
tions? So, how to distinguish (non-arbitrarily) between those subjects that de-
serve reparations and those that don’t? It’s very hard to resolve these matters, 
not only because our knowledge is imperfect, but because there is no fact of 
the matter to discover in the first place and no natural stopping point for our 
calculations (Waldron 1992). A second major problem is the elapse of time. 
The longer the time and the greater the number of generations between the 
present and the past injustice, the more complicated and difficult is to reason 
about this issue. 
Turning back to Shklar’s argument, for her everyone could be a victim, and the 
feeling of injustice is a feeling that has to be studied and dealt with. Liberalism 
has to integrate this feeling and defend the victim and can be considered “uni-
versal” only if it incorporates the concepts of injustice and political surveillance 
to prevent cruelty. Human security is ultimately a response to the injustice in 
the world. This is why Shklar thinks it so important for a theory of justice to be 
supplemented by reflections on our sense of injustice. These adjustments will 
no doubt give rise to other injustices: «to redress one injustice is to create an-
other» (Shklar 1990, p. 121). But in a fair political system, injustices will be dis-
tributed among all: «The best way to bridge the gap between settled expecta-
tions and demands for public change may be a system of effective and contin-
uous citizen participation in which no one wins or loses all the time» (Shklar 
1990, p. 121). 
So, to reply to famous Nozick’s question: «How far back must one go in wip-
ing clean the historical side of injustices? » (Nozick 1974, p. 231), and in order 
to determine which complaints and which commitments are legitimate and 
which are not, we must resort a theory of injustice that should not be reduced 
to historical injustice, but neither can escape the legacy of the historical injus-
tices that precede it: «If injustices are to be fixed, they must be fixed by volun-
tary means, in respect of all the innocent parties who had nothing to do with 
the original injustice» (Narveson 2009, p. 7, 14). 
 
 
8. LIBERALISM OF INJUSTICE. A NORMATIVE PROPOSAL 
 
It might be argued that rectifying a situation of injustice requires not just the 
mechanisms of procedural justice, but constraints on the kinds of factors that 
cause some groups to have easier access to these mechanisms than others. It is 
still Shklar who emphasizes that any limits on the power and wealth of citizens 
will be felt as injustices by them and that if those advocating constraints, say, 
on the inheritance of wealth, must win some of the time, so must those who 
are opposed to them. The great contribution of what it could be called Shklar’s 
liberalism of (fear and) injustice is to have shifted the focus from justice to injustice 
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and to have placed the responsibility for a democracy's well-being on its citi-
zens' commitment to expressing their rage at the injustices they feel have been 
done to themselves and others. 
Conceptions of injustice are therefore important because they are central to de-
fining the way in which people think of themselves. Perhaps responsibility will 
be the first principle between principles of injustice applicable in this theory, 
that is not separate from outside the society that it interrogates and challenges, 
but is, rather, connected to it (Walzer 1987), engaged in its central concerns and 
involved in the struggles of the common people. And an ideal of human plural-
ity is central to the comprehension of injustice’s issue. On this point, that is on 
addressing injustice, we can elaborate a framework which sets out some types 
of remedy, and in which the compensation paradigm is only one, and often, 
the least attractive one. The ultimate aim of liberalism of injustice should not 
be so much to compensate for injustice, but to create circumstances in which 
there is no injustice that calls for compensation. We can infer from Shklar’s 
criticism of relativism a philosophical foundation for human security; we can 
infer from Michael Walzer that the struggle against the fear of terror and injus-
tice implies something else in the bargain, in the sense that “We are defending 
more than our lives, we are defending our way of life” (Walzer 1996, p. 18). A 
theory of injustice will bear out that our dignity as persons includes an irreduc-
ibly second-personal authority (Darwall 2006) to demand respect for this very 
authority and for the requirements with which it gives us our public and politi-
cal standing. 
Theory of injustice as a project of an interrelation between disrespect and hu-
man integrity outlined in negative terms seems finally to represent a minimalist 
thought of universality. But the architecture that goes beyond the presently in-
ternational order and disorder must be defined in positive terms and not only 
in negative ones. The causes of injustices are served not by a generalized skep-
ticism, but by a variety of forms of critical inquiry; by factual studies that put 
the lie to myth and prejudice and that reveal large-scale patterns of social injus-
tice; by ethical examinations that subject proposed norms to generalizing test 
of consistency and impartiality; by reflexive attention to the possible ideological 
influences on common understandings of causation and political categoriza-
tion. Finally, we have to deal with injustice not just as a philosophical notion 
but also as a normative toolbox for addressing disadvantage. Because first, in-
justice is essentially plural; second, and relatedly, remedies for addressing injus-
tice are themselves plural. Third, a remedy may actually produce other forms of 
injustice or unfairness. 
A theory of injustice can expect practical support within reality to come not 
from such sources of positive motivation as altruism or respect but rather from 
the experience of disrespect: «The feelings of moral indignation with which 
human beings react to insult and disrespect contain the potential for an idealiz-
ing anticipation of conditions of successful, undistorted recognition» (Honneth 
1992, p. 199). To reflect on injustice, finally, simply makes justice less uncer-
tain. 
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